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ABSTRACT
We develop a model that clarifies the respective advantages and disadvantages of academic and
private-sector research. Our model assumes full protection of intellectual property rights at all stages
of the development process, and hence does not rely on lack of appropriability or spillovers to
generate a rationale for academic research. Instead, we focus on control-rights considerations, and
argue that the fundamental tradeoff between academia and the private sector is one of creative
control versus focus. By serving as a precommitment mechanism that allows scientists to freely
pursue their own interests, academia can be indispensable for early-stage research. At the same time,
the private sector’s ability to direct scientists towards higher-payoff activities makes it more
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Many important innovations, in industries ranging from pharmaceuticals to
computer technology, have their origins in publicly funded research conducted
at universities, foundations, and other non-pro￿t institutions. The traditional
case for government funding of such academic research, as articulated by Nelson
(1959) and Arrow (1962), is a familiar one: because of knowledge spillovers and
imperfect intellectual-property-rights (IPR) protection, the economic value asso-
ciated with certain kinds of ideas cannot be fully appropriated by the developers
of these ideas, leading to private-sector underinvestment in ￿basic￿research. (It
should be noted, however, that while arguments based on spillovers make clear
the need for basic research to be subsidized by the government, they are less
clear on why this subsidy needs to happen in a di⁄erent organizational form￿ i.e.,
in a university, as opposed to in a private corporation.)
In recent years, there has been a substantial expansion of formal IPR protec-
tion for early-stage research. This trend is in part a result of the Bayh-Dole Act
of 1980, which gives academic institutions the right to patent and commercialize
discoveries made with government-sponsored research support, and which has
helped to launch a boom in the creation of university technology-transfer of-
￿ces. Lach and Schankerman (2004) report that the number of patents granted
to university scientists increased from 500 in 1982 to more than 3,100 in 1998.1
According to the traditional view, one might expect this trend toward in-
creased IPR protection to be a largely bene￿cial one. After all, if academia is
thought of as a second-best solution to the underinvestment problem caused by
insu¢ cient appropriability, then increased appropriability and an accompany-
ing shift of research activity to the private sector should be e¢ ciency-enhancing.
However, the trend has been highly controversial, particularly in the ￿elds of
biotechnology and pharmaceuticals. Many authors have expressed the concern
that innovation in these ￿elds is ultimately held back, rather than encouraged,
when IPR protection is granted to the sorts of ideas that have traditionally
been left in the public domain. Heller and Eisenberg (1998, p. 698) talk of
an ￿anti-commons￿e⁄ect associated with early IPR protection, arguing that:
￿A proliferation of intellectual property rights upstream may be sti￿ ing life-
saving innovations further downstream in the course of research and product
development.￿
In this paper, we develop a model that: i) clari￿es the respective advantages
and disadvantages of academic and private-sector research; and ii) allows one
to say when￿ in the process of developing an idea from its very earliest stages to
a ￿nished commercial product￿ it is normatively optimal to make the transition
from academia to the private sector. Importantly, we assume full IPR protection
at all stages of the development process. We do so not because we think that
this is the most realistic scenario in all cases. Rather, it is the scenario where we
think the tension between academic and private-sector funding of innovation is
1See also Henderson, Ja⁄ee, and Trajtenberg (1998).
1the most interesting, and least well-understood. Certainly, there are many sorts
of early-stage ideas where IPR protection is simply not feasible, and hence where,
for the traditional reasons, academic research is the only option. Nevertheless,
in ￿elds like biotechnology, it is becoming increasingly evident that a lack of
available IPR protection is not the only relevant factor in thinking about the
merits of academia vs. the private sector.
Our model is based on authority and control-rights considerations, and em-
phasizes what we believe to be a fundamental tradeo⁄ between academia and
the private sector, namely the tradeo⁄of creative control versus focus. We take
the de￿ning characteristic of academic research to be that individual scientists
retain the decision rights over what speci￿c projects to take on, and what meth-
ods to use in tackling these projects (within certain bounds, of course). Indeed,
in our model, academia e⁄ectively boils down to nothing more than a commit-
ment mechanism that ensures scientists that these decision rights will not be
abrogated.2 In contrast, the de￿ning characteristic of private-sector research
is that decision rights inevitably reside with the owner/manager of the ￿rm,
who can (and will) largely dictate project choice and methods to the individual
scientists who work for the ￿rm.3
By modeling academia as a commitment device, we deliberately abstract
from a variety of other issues. These include the di¢ cult question of what the
objective function of academia is or should be, as well as many other job-design
aspects that are relevant to the life and performance of universities (e.g., ex-
plicit and implicit incentive schemes, promotion systems, multitasking between
research and teaching, etc.).4 Instead, we concentrate on analyzing the costs
and bene￿ts of delegating authority to scientists, and on showing how these
costs and bene￿ts vary over the life cycle of a research program.
More speci￿cally, following Aghion and Tirole (1997), and in the general
spirit of the property-rights literature (Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and
Moore (1990), Hart (1995)), we argue that scientists value creative control, and
will have to be paid a wage premium in order to give it up. This assumption
receives striking support in recent empirical work by Stern (2004), who studies
the job market for recent PhDs in biology. By using multiple job o⁄ers, Stern
is able to control for di⁄erences in ability across job candidates. After doing
so, he ￿nds that wages are substantially lower in jobs that promise scientists
either some freedom to pursue their own individual research agendas, or that
encourage the publication of this work.5
2Lacetera (2005) also emphasizes the precommitment function of academia. As we argue
below, the ability of academia to precommit not to interfere with scientists is intimately
connected to its non-pro￿t nature. In practice, this function is further reinforced by the
tenure system; see, e.g., McPherson and Schapiro (1999).
3Howitt (2003) stresses that ￿...the kind of eccentricity that leads one down the path (of
individual creativity) is rarely tolerated in private corporations, whose culture in this respect
is a collective one that rewards employees for subordinating their private goals to that of the
organization￿.
4Because our focus is on the role of academia in the the innovation process, we have little
to say about, e.g., its role in fostering research in the humanities.
5This result also continues to hold when the sample is restricted to job o⁄ers from private-
2Thus one advantage of academia is that scientists can be hired more cheaply
than in the private sector. The disadvantage of academia, however, is that they
may end up working on projects that they ￿nd interesting, but that have little
immediate economic value. In contrast, ￿rms can, by virtue of their control
rights, direct scientists to work on those projects that have the highest economic
payo⁄s.
It turns out that the resolution of this tradeo⁄ depends crucially on how far
from commercialization a particular line of research is. To be concrete, imagine
a line of biotech research which consists of ten distinct stages, and which will
yield a drug worth $10 billion if and only if all ten stages are successfully
completed. At the ￿nal stage, so close to an enormous potential payo⁄, the
wages of individual scientists are relatively insigni￿cant, and the most important
consideration is simply ensuring that every available scientist is working on the
task at hand, as opposed to on some other pet project. Thus the directedness
advantage of the private sector looms large, and it is optimal to have the project
be privately owned at the last stage.
Now consider things from the perspective of the very ￿rst stage of the re-
search line. It may be that even if this ￿rst stage is successful, there is only a
one-in-a-thousand chance that all nine of the subsequent stages will be also. So
loosely speaking, the value of succeeding in the ￿rst stage is only on the order
of $10 million. In this case, it becomes much more important to cede creative
control, so as to economize on scientists￿wages: if private-sector scientists cost
$200,000 each per year, and academic scientists cost only $100,000 each per
year, it may well be better to locate the project in academia, even if this entails
some probability of the scientists wandering o⁄ in other directions.
Thus our ￿rst contribution is to provide a simple account of why it can
be socially optimal to have earlier-stage, more ￿basic￿ research take place in
academia, without relying on spillovers, imperfect IPR protection, or any of the
other frictions that are usually invoked to rationalize a role for public funding of
research. Somewhat more strongly, we also show that some lines of research can
only get started in academia, and are simply not initially viable in the private
sector.
Our second contribution is to ask whether, with full IPR protection, it is
possible for ideas to get privatized too early. The answer is yes. Ideas will
in general be viable in the private sector￿ i.e., will be able to attract non-zero
bids from private ￿rms￿ before it is socially optimal for them to migrate away
from academia. In other words, if university technology transfer o¢ ces follow
a policy aimed at maximizing their individual revenues from selling patents to
private ￿rms, ideas will tend to get into the private sector too soon.6 In this
sense, the model validates the ￿anti-commons￿concerns about there being such
sector ￿rms.
6Anecdotal evidence suggests that some universities have been very aggressive in pursuing
revenue maximization based on royalties from their patents. See, e.g., ￿Columbia￿ s Pursuit of
Patent Riches Angers Companies,￿by Bernard Wysocki Jr., (Wall Street Journal, December
11, 2004) for a discussion of Columbia University￿ s management of its lucrative portfolio of
biotechnology patents.
3a thing as too much IPR protection for early-stage ideas: one can come up with
examples where, in the context of the model, social welfare would be increased
by eliminating early-stage IPR protection, and thereby forcibly delaying the
transition from academia to the private sector.
As noted earlier, much of the attention in the policy debate has been devoted
to the biotechnology industry, where the ability of ￿rms to patent individual
genes has been a particular source of worry to some. Murray and Stern (2004)
discuss an interesting case:
￿Anecdotal evidence also suggests that whole gene patents (such
as those for the breast cancer genes BRCA-1 and BRCA-2) have
also sti￿ ed innovation and rendered more complex knowledge accu-
mulation around breast cancer diagnostics and therapeutics...In the
breast cancer case, a portfolio of over a dozen US and international
patents gave biotechnology ￿rm Myriad exclusive rights to commer-
cialize laboratory testing services, diagnostic test kits and thera-
peutic products that use the BRCA1/2 DNA sequences. However,
because the discovery of the genes was based not only on Myriad￿ s
commercially funded research e⁄orts but also built upon interna-
tionally generated public knowledge, private ownership of the breast
cancer gene diagnostic kit was highly controversial.￿
However, in spite of the visceral pull of examples like these, as a matter of
basic theory it is not immediately clear why a ￿rm like Myriad, once granted
exclusive access to the breast cancer genes, would not have very strong incentives
to pursue all economically viable applications of these genes. Moreover, even if
Myriad does not have the in-house scienti￿c expertise to go down all the di⁄erent
positive-NPV research paths, why can￿ t it either hire the right scientists, or
license its patents to other ￿rms who are better positioned to do so?7
Building on our control-rights foundation, we go on to develop two com-
plementary explanations for why a ￿rm like Myriad might not pursue all the
economically viable applications of the breast cancer genes that it owns. The
￿rst story ￿ ows directly from our insight that private-sector ￿rms￿cost struc-
tures make them excessively averse to relatively early-stage research. Suppose
that there are two potentially legitimate research projects that make use of
Myriad￿ s gene patents. One is an ￿applied￿ project that is only two stages
away from a commercial payo⁄, while the other is a more ￿basic￿project that is
￿ve stages away from any payo⁄. It is possible that the ultimate payo⁄ on the
latter, more basic project is su¢ ciently high that, evaluated at academic-sector
wages, it is not only positive-NPV, but of greater NPV than the applied project.
At the same time, it is also possible that, evaluated at private-sector wages, the
basic project is negative-NPV, for the reasons described above. If this is the
7Heller and Eisenberg (1998) argue that the central problem is the fragmentation of prop-
erty rights across di⁄erent private ￿rms. If, for example, multiple patented inputs need to
be combined to generate a new product, and each patent is owned by a di⁄erent ￿rm, various
inter-￿rm transactions costs can be a barrier to e¢ ciency.
4case, then when a private-sector ￿rm like Myriad has the decision rights, it will
allocate all of its scientists to the applied project, and completely ignore the ba-
sic project. Note that this conclusion does not rest on any exogenously-imposed
constraints regarding the scope of private ￿rms: it is not that Myriad cannot
manage multiple projects at once, it simply ￿nds it uneconomic to do so in this
particular example, given its wage structure.
By contrast, if Myriad had never acquired the patents in the ￿rst place, and
the ideas were left freely available to academic scientists, government funding
of breast cancer research would naturally tend to lead to some progress on both
projects, as individual scientists followed their own interests.8 Moreover, the
government￿ s investment in each of the two projects would be positive-NPV,
because they would now each be evaluated at academic-sector wages. There
would still be some loss of direction inherent in this outcome￿ without the ability
to direct scientists, academia can never ensure the optimal allocation of scientists
across the two projects￿ but this might be better than the private solution, which
simply shuts down the more basic project.
It is easy to see where full IPR protection can go wrong in this example.
Ex ante, even knowing that it will pursue only the applied project, the patents
for the breast cancer genes may be quite valuable to Myriad, and it might be
willing to bid aggressively to acquire them from a university technology-transfer
o¢ ce. The problem is that in setting its reservation price, the tech transfer o¢ ce
may not internalize the fact that privatization denies society the opportunity to
￿nance more early-stage research in breast cancer at academic-sector wages.
Another reason why private-sector ￿rms may pass up certain positive-NPV
research projects that would be undertaken in academia has to do with the
informational limitations that are inherent in directed research. Recall that
the advantage of locating research in the private sector is that a principal (i.e.,
an owner, or a designated supervisor) can e⁄ectively force scientists to work on
those projects with the highest commercial payo⁄s, rather than on worthless
puzzle-solving. However, in reality it may be hard for any one principal to
always discriminate between good and bad projects. For example, suppose
that, starting with a given patent, there are two distinct research strategies that
scientists can pursue, and that the relative payo⁄s to these strategies depend on
the realization of a random variable that only scientists (and not the principal)
can observe, with neither strategy dominating the other in all states of the
world.
In this setting, there is value to letting scientists freely experiment in the
early stages of a research program. Experimentation may reveal the underlying
state of the world￿ i.e., which general approach to the problem at hand is the
better one￿ and this is information which will be useful in future stages. More-
8See, e.g., ￿Cancer Research Has Many Healthy Side E⁄ects,￿ by Raja Mishra (Boston
Globe, February 8, 2005). This article discusses the many contributions to other medical
￿elds￿ including AIDS, cardiovascular disease, kidney disease, multiple sclerosis, and psoriasis￿
that have come from research on cancer at the Dana-Farber Cancer Institute. The president
of Dana-Farber is quoted in the article as saying that the non-pro￿t institute encourages such
spin-o⁄ research, which is largely funded by federal research grants.
5over, we show that under certain circumstances, it is impossible to sustain such
experimentation in the private sector. Instead, private-sector scientists will
simply be forced to follow whichever strategy looks more promising according
to the principal￿ s priors, in which case no information is produced that can be
used in later stages. The advantage of academia in this version of the model
is that it encourages experimentation in the early stages, which allows private-
sector principals to bring better information to bear when they direct scientists
in the later stages.
Although much of our analysis treats academia and the private sector as
extreme organizational forms￿ the former one in which scientists face no incen-
tives whatsoever, the latter one in which research strategies are always dictated
from above￿ the model can also rationalize the existence of hybrid governance
structures that lie between these two extremes. In particular, we examine pri-
vate ￿rms that behave in a less than fully authoritarian manner, leaving some
control to their scientists.9 Such ￿rms may be the optimal organizational form
at an intermediate stage in a research program, at which point they e⁄ectively
strike a compromise between the extreme creative freedom of academia and the
absolute directedness of more fully authoritarian ￿rms. We also consider the
e⁄ect of introducing small monetary incentives (e.g., prizes) into an academic
setting. While these variations enrich our basic model, and provide a more
nuanced view of the roles of both academia and the private sector, they do not
alter the main messages of our theory.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Sections 2 and 3,
we introduce and then solve the most basic version of the model, in which at
any given stage there is only one economically legitimate way to work with an
existing idea carried forward from the previous stage. In this version, the only
downside to the private sector is its more expensive wage structure. Thus, when
we say that an idea gets taken private ￿too early￿ , the ine¢ ciency is manifested
in the fact that￿ because of the high wages￿ a private ￿rm may employ too few
scientists to work with the idea (relative to what would happen in academia).
In Section 4, we add the possibility that, in addition to pushing forward an idea
along an existing chain, a scientist may instead prefer to branch o⁄and work on
something that is more basic in nature, but still economically legitimate. Here,
there is an additional ine¢ ciency associated with going private too early, namely
an excessive aversion on the part of the private sector to ￿stepping back￿in this
fashion. In Section 5, we examine hybrid governance structures. We consider
in turn: i) the case where some real authority over the choice of research strategy
may be left to scientists in a private ￿rm; and ii) the possibility that incentive
schemes are used to focus the interests of academic scientists. In Section 6, we
assume that scientists may be better informed than private-sector principals.
This yields one more cost of early privatization: it shuts down experimentation,
and thus prevents the information of early-stage scientists from being made
available to later-stage principals. Section 7 discusses the connection to related
9The role of Celera Genomics in the human genome project is a good example of such a
hybrid structure (see Howitt (2003)).
6literature, and Section 8 concludes.
2 Basic Framework
2.1 Technology
The development of an economically valuable product (e.g., a new drug) starts
with an initial idea I0. This idea can be built on by subsequent scientists, in
stages. If stage 1 is successful, there is a re￿ned idea I1; this re￿ned idea can
be further worked on to potentially generate an even-more-re￿ned idea I2, etc.
There are a total of k stages after the initial idea. If and only if all k stages are
successful, there is a ￿nal idea Ik which generates a marketable product with
value V .
The probability of success at any given stage depends on: i) the number of
scientists who are active at that stage; and ii) the research strategies that they
pursue. When a scientist is ￿rst exposed to an idea that has been brought
forward from the previous stage, he must decide what strategy he wants to
adopt in working with it. In the simplest version of the model, there are two
options. First, the scientist can follow a ￿practical￿strategy, which maximizes
the probability that the current idea will be re￿ned, and hence move on to the
next stage. In particular, if there are n scientists at stage j who begin with
the idea Ij￿1 and who all follow a practical strategy, there is a probability ￿(n)
that the idea will be re￿ned and yield the new idea Ij.
We consider two di⁄erent speci￿cations of the function ￿(n): i) ￿(n) = p for
all n ￿ 1, and ￿(0) = 0; and ii) ￿(n) = (1 ￿ (1 ￿ p)n). The ￿rst speci￿cation
corresponds to the assumption that all scientists working on the practical strat-
egy have a perfectly correlated draw from the same success/failure distribution.
This makes things especially simple￿ since it implies that in equilibrium there
will always be exactly one scientist active at each research stage￿ and hence
provides a useful way to illustrate the intuition for some of our results. At
the same time, it can be too simple for some purposes, not allowing us to see
the e⁄ects that arise when n is meaningfully endogenous. Hence the second
speci￿cation, which corresponds to the assumption that scientists working on
the practical strategy have independent draws from the same success/failure
distribution, with each individual having a success probability of p, so that the
probability of at least one success among a group of n is given by (1￿(1￿p)n).10
Instead of the practical strategy, any given scientist may choose to follow
the ￿alternative￿strategy in working with an existing idea. In this case, the
scientist has a zero individual probability of success, and hence contributes
nothing to a group￿ s chances of a breakthrough. The simplest interpretation
is that the alternative strategy is fundamentally worthless: i.e., it amounts to
10Note that in our formulation, scientists only have one chance at success at each stage of
the innovation process￿ in other words, if they fail, there is no notion of going back and trying
again. Thus our model is not rich enough to capture the possibility that, e.g., academic
research may ultimately lead to a successful outcome, but may get there more slowly than
private-sector research. This might be an interesting direction for further extensions.
7the scientist spending his time on puzzle-solving activities with no hope of an
economic payo⁄. However, another possibility￿ which we explore below￿ is that
even if the alternative strategy does not advance the current line of research, it
may spawn an entirely new line of inquiry instead.
2.2 Scientists￿preferences
There is an in￿nite pool of potential scientists. These scientists have no wealth,
and hence cannot pay for the ￿xed setup costs of research (which we take to be
arbitrarily small for simplicity). Hence they can only pursue research activities
if they are hired either by an academic institution or a private-sector ￿rm￿ they
cannot be self-employed. Each scientist also has an outside option R that he
can obtain by working in another profession, e.g., as a taxi driver. This outside
option sets a ￿ oor on the wages that scientists must earn.
Our key assumption is that scientists value creative independence￿ i.e., they
value the right to choose how to pursue a particular idea. Speci￿cally, after
being exposed to idea Ij￿1, each scientist at stage j decides whether he would
better enjoy following the practical strategy or the alternative strategy. If he
is able to undertake his favored strategy, he su⁄ers no disutility from working.
In other words, if a scientist could be promised ex ante that he would always
be able to follow his favored strategy, he would be willing to work for a wage
of exactly R. However, if the scientist has to undertake the strategy that he
likes less, he su⁄ers disutility of z. So if the scientist is certain that he is going
to be forced to follow the less attractive strategy, he will set a reservation wage
of R + z. In between these two extremes, scientists behave in a risk-neutral
fashion, and require a wage premium that is proportional to the probability that
they will have to undertake the less desirable strategy.
Importantly, neither the scientists themselves, nor their potential employers,
know the scientists￿preferences over the two strategies ex ante￿ i.e., before the
scientists have had a chance to look at the previous-stage idea and think about
it. That is, scientists￿preferences for the practical vs. alternative strategies
depend on the speci￿cs of what kind of work these strategies will entail, and
these speci￿cs in turn depend on the nature of the previous-stage idea. To
take a concrete example: a particular scientist may like to do a certain very
speci￿c kind of experimental work. Ex ante, it is unclear to him how this kind
of experimental work will tie in with the project at hand. But after he has
digested the previous-stage idea, it will become apparent whether his preferred
experimental techniques are actually useful for pushing the idea to the next
stage (in which case it will turn out that he is a practical type) or not (in which
case it will turn out that he is an alternative type).
We assume that the ex ante probability that a scientist prefers to follow the
practical strategy is given by ￿. Finally, we assume perfect correlation across
all scientists at a given stage in terms of their preferences over the two strategies.
In other words, either all scientists at a given stage prefer the practical strategy,
or all prefer the alternative strategy. This strong perfect-correlation assumption
is not necessary for our results￿ any non-zero positive correlation will do￿ but it
8greatly simpli￿es the exposition.11 Moreover, positive correlation in preferences
can be thought of as re￿ ecting the natural idea that some types of research are
simply more fun for most scientists than others.
2.3 Academia
As noted in the Introduction, we present an extremely rudimentary and stripped-
down rendition of academia. We take the de￿ning characteristic of this organi-
zational form to be that it represents a precommitment to leave control over the
choice of research strategy in the hands of individual scientists. Although this
assumption would appear to be empirically well-motivated, a natural question is
why academia is uniquely able to make this commitment. We suspect that the
non-pro￿t nature of academia plays a central role in this regard, a point that
we develop more formally in Section 5 below. In particular, if one thinks of
supervisory e⁄ort (the resources devoted to monitoring and directing scientists)
as endogenous, it is plausible that academic administrators have much lower
incentives to exert such e⁄ort than, e.g., a corporate CEO, whose compensation
can be linked to the share price.12
In the baseline version of the model, we set aside the possibility of incentive
schemes (either implicit or explicit) in academia. In Section 5, we e⁄ectively
endogenize this assumption. We show that if z is non-stochastic, it is gener-
ally optimal not to use incentives in academia. Intuitively, if it is desirable
to induce all scientists￿ irrespective of their preferences￿ to follow the practical
strategy, this is more cheaply done in the private sector, where they can simply
be directed to do so, as opposed to in academia, where they have to be promised
unconditional bonuses for voluntarily choosing this option.
Finally, we assume that if the results from academic research are not sold to
the private sector, these results are published and freely disseminated to other
academic scientists. These assumptions are the only features that distinguish
academia from the private sector in our model. In particular, we abstract from
the question of what the exact mission of universities is or should be, or whether
universities should be private or public.
The outcome of any stage j that takes place in academia is easy to describe.
Suppose there are n scientists active at this stage. Each scientist is paid a
wage wa = R, and always works on his preferred strategy. This implies that
with probability ￿, all n scientists work on the practical strategy, and with
probability (1 ￿ ￿), all n work on the alternative strategy. Thus the ex ante
probability of advancing to the next stage is given by ￿￿(n).
11More precisely, we need to avoid the limiting case where there is e⁄ectively a continuum
of scientists with independent preferences. In this case, hiring n scientists in academia is
functionally equivalent to hiring ￿n scientists in the private sector￿ with probability one, both
yield the same amount of research e⁄ort devoted to the practical strategy￿ and the solution at
all stages of the research line will be to go with whichever option involves lower total wages.
12See Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Acemoglu, Kremer and Mian (2003) for related
discussions about the role of non-pro￿ts.
92.4 The private sector: ￿rms and property rights
At some stage, a ￿rm may acquire exclusive rights to an idea. Thus the following
transaction is contractually feasible: an academic scientist (or the institution
for which he works) may sell his idea to an entrepreneur, and promise not to
publish the idea or in any other way share the idea with anybody else. The
model therefore incorporates the potential for a strong from of IPR protection
at all stages of the innovation process.
An important assumption is that only an entrepreneur has the funds to pay
for an idea, as scientists have no funds of their own. This implies that if an
entrepreneur is to take the idea forward, she will have to hire scientists as her
agents at each subsequent stage of the development process. The entrepreneur
can only derive utility from monetary sources, so she will only pay for an idea if
she can earn a monetary return from it. Unlike the scientists, the entrepreneur
has no innate preferences over research strategies. Nor does she get any utility
from an idea being widely disseminated.
At the time the entrepreneur hires a team of scientists to work on a given
stage, she cannot know the scientists￿preferences over the practical vs. alter-
native strategies￿ these preferences only become evident once the scientists are
inside the ￿rm and have been given access to the idea by the entrepreneur. Yet
ex post, the entrepreneur has the authority to force the scientists to work on
whichever strategy she (the entrepreneur) deems to be most pro￿table. Indeed,
it is impossible for the entrepreneur to precommit to doing otherwise￿ this is the
de￿ning characteristic of private-sector research. For example, once it becomes
clear that the practical strategy requires a speci￿c type of experimental work
(call it type A), while the alternative strategy involves a di⁄erent kind of exper-
imental work (call it type B), the entrepreneur will force the scientists￿hands
by only buying the type of laboratory equipment that is compatible with type
A work.
It follows that scientists will demand a wage of wp = R + (1 ￿ ￿)z in order
to work in the private sector. The (1 ￿ ￿)z markup over the academic wage
represents compensation for loss of creative freedom￿ the fact that scientists now
always have to adopt the practical strategy, whether this turns out to coincide
with their preferences or not.13
3 The Case of a Single Research Line
The initial point of departure for our analysis is the case of a single research
line, as described above. First, we start with the perfectly-correlated draws
assumption, which ensures that n = 1 at all stages. Next, we consider the
independent-draws alternative, in which n is endogenous, and in which ￿(n) =
(1 ￿ (1 ￿ p)n).
13If scientists were risk averse, the markup over the academic wage would be increased,
because of the uncertainty that a private-sector scientist faces as to whether or not he will be
able to pursue his favored strategy.
103.1 Perfectly correlated draws: n = 1
3.1.1 The basic trade-o⁄ between academia and private research
Consider a project which involves k stages, and imagine that the ￿rst k ￿ 1
stages have been successful, so that we are now at stage k, with only one more
success required to generate a payo⁄ of V . If the last round of research is




k) = pV ￿ wp: (1)
If instead the last round of research is conducted in academia, and one
scientist is hired, the expected payo⁄ is:
E(￿a
k) = ￿pV ￿ wa: (2)
Thus there is a simple tradeo⁄: on the one hand, wages are lower in acad-
emia. On the other hand, the inability to direct scientists in academia means
that the probability of success is lower than in the private sector. Comparing
the two equations, it is easy to see that the private sector will yield a higher
payo⁄ than academia if and only if:
(1 ￿ ￿)pV > (wp ￿ wa); (3)
or
pV > z: (4)
An important ￿rst piece of intuition is that the private sector looks relatively
more attractive when p and V are high, i.e., when the expected payo⁄to research
is greater.
3.1.2 Why do we need academia?
Denote the maximum of E(￿
p
k) and E(￿a
k) by ￿k. Folding back to stage k ￿1,
we can now compare:
E(￿
p
k￿1) = p￿k ￿ wp: (5)
and:
E(￿a
k￿1) = ￿p￿k ￿ wa: (6)
This implies that the private sector will yield a higher payo⁄ than academia
at stage k ￿ 1 if and only if:
p￿k > z: (7)
Since ￿k < V , it follows that if the private sector is value-maximizing at
stage k ￿ 1, it is also value-maximizing at stage k. This recursive logic can be
extended backwards, so that at any earlier stage i, we have:
E(￿
p
i) = p￿i+1 ￿ wp: (8)
11and:
E(￿a
i ) = ￿p￿i+1 ￿ wa: (9)
Moreover, the private sector will generate a higher payo⁄ than academia at
stage i and all future stages if and only if:
p￿i+1 > z: (10)
Observe that as i declines￿ i.e., as we move backward to earlier and earlier stages￿
it becomes progressively harder for the private sector to outperform academia,
since ￿i+1 falls. This immediately implies:
Proposition 1: It cannot be value maximizing to have academia operate at
later stages than the private sector.
Next, we can show that academia may become indispensable at the earlier
stages of a line if the total length k of the line is su¢ ciently large. To see this,
note that if the entire line is located in the private sector, its ex ante value,
￿(allprivate), is given by:
￿(allprivate) = pkV ￿ (1 + :::pk+1)wp: (11)
But this expression clearly becomes negative for k su¢ ciently large since pkV
converges to zero whereas the expected wage bill (1+:::pk+1)wp remains bounded
away from zero and increasing in k. We thus have:
Proposition 2: A research program with a su¢ ciently large number of
stages k will not be viable if located exclusively in the private sector.
The proposition by itself does not fully establish the necessity of academia￿
we still need to show that for a non-empty set of parameter values, a research
line that is not viable if located exclusively in the private sector can be viable if
started in academia. But this latter point is easy to demonstrate. For example,
suppose that wa = R = 0, and consider the ex ante value ￿(allacademic) of a
line that is located exclusively in academia:
￿(allacademic) = (￿p)kV; (12)
which is obviously positive for all k.14
We should emphasize at this point that the notions of ￿basic￿and ￿applied￿
research implicit in our analysis are very di⁄erent than what is usually seen in
the literature on innovation. The tradition in this work is to think of the ￿basic-
ness￿of a particular line of research as being a function of how inappropriable
14It is easy to show that a necessary condition for academia to be viable one stage earlier
than the private sector is that ￿z > R. Intuitively, when ￿z is large relative to R, this tends
to make academia relatively attractive because: i) academic scientists choose the practical
strategy fairly often even without being directed to do so; and ii) there is a proportionally
large wage premium in the private sector.
12are the ideas that it generates. In contrast, in our setting there are never any
appropriability problems, and basic-ness￿ i.e., the necessity of locating research
in an academic setting￿ is instead a function of the number of remaining steps
until a commercial payo⁄ can be realized.
3.1.3 The socially optimal transition point
Using our recursive approach, it is straightforward to calculate the point at
which it is socially optimal for a research line to make the transition from acad-
emia to the private sector. The following lemma is an immediate consequence
of (10):
Lemma 1: From the perspective of a social planner, there is a unique tran-
sition point i￿, such that it is optimal for stage i￿ to be the ￿rst stage conducted
in the private sector. This transition point i￿ is the smallest value of i that
satis￿es:
p￿i+1 = pk￿i+1V ￿ (p + :::pk￿i)wp > z: (13)
The comparative statics properties of the optimal transition point follow
from this lemma. They are intuitive, and can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 3: Holding ￿xed the number of stages k in a research line, it
is optimal to have the transition to the private sector occur earlier if: i) V is
greater; ii) ￿ is smaller; or iii) z is smaller.
Given an optimal transition policy, we still need to check that the research
project is ex ante positive NPV￿ i.e., that it is socially worthwhile to fund the
stages prior to i￿ in academia. If the line is managed optimally throughout, its
ex ante value, which we denote by ￿(i￿), is given by:
￿(i￿) = ￿i
￿￿1pkV ￿ (1 + ￿p + :::(￿p)i
￿￿2)wa ￿ ￿i
￿￿2(pi
￿￿1 + :::pk￿1)wp; (14)
where i￿ is the optimal transition point determined in the previous lemma.
The ex ante feasibility (henceforth, EAF) constraint for the research line
is then simply the condition that ￿(i￿) > 0: This condition is always satis￿ed
if wa = 0, so that academic research is costless, and in much of what follows
we use this assumption to keep things simple.15 However, we will also brie￿ y
consider what happens when wa > 0.
3.1.4 Comparison with early privatization
As noted in the Introduction, a number of authors have expressed the concern
that, in a world with full IPR protection, privatization of a research line may
15 A less literal way of thinking about the assumption that wa = 0 is that, for whatever
reason, certain research lines are always able to get funding in academia, irrespective of NPV
considerations. This could be because the government agency responsible for funding these
lines has other objectives besides value maximization.
13occur sooner than is socially optimal. To provide a concrete way to think about
this issue, imagine that the decision of whether to sell an academic idea to a
private-sector ￿rm rests in the hands of the university technology transfer o¢ ce,
so that the transition to the private sector occurs as soon as the value of the line
under private management exceeds the reservation value T of the tech transfer
o¢ ce. If we denote by i(T) the ￿rst stage conducted in the private sector under
this scenario, we have that i(T) is the smallest value of i that satis￿es:
pk￿i+1V ￿ (1 + p + :::pk￿i)wp > T: (15)
Under this transition policy, the EAF constraint is modi￿ed, with i￿ being
replaced everywhere by i(T):
￿i(T)￿1pkV ￿(1+￿p+:::(￿p)i(T)￿2)wa￿￿i(T)￿2(pi(T)￿1+:::pk￿1)wp > 0: (16)
This condition is obviously more restrictive than the EAF condition correspond-
ing to socially optimal transition. That is, it is harder for the research program
to be ex ante positive-NPV if it is managed suboptimally than if it is managed
optimally.
In what follows, we consider the limiting case where the reservation price T
is set at an arbitrarily low positive value. This implies that, absent any coun-
tervailing government policy, an idea transitions from academia to the private
sector as soon as any private sector ￿rm ￿nds it economic to make a non-zero
bid for it. We refer to this outcome as ￿early privatization￿ , and denote the
associated transition point i(0) by ie. Clearly this is an extreme case, and not
necessarily the most realistic one. However, it provides the starkest possible
illustration of the concerns implicit in the ￿anti-commons￿view: if there are
ever going to be deviations from social optimality￿ in terms of ideas winding
up in the private sector too soon￿ we will see these deviations most starkly by
focusing on the early-privatization case.
As a logical matter, the early-privatization outcome can be rationalized by
thinking of a revenue-maximizing tech transfer o¢ ce that recognizes that if an
idea that it controls in the current stage is instead allowed to stay in academia
for one more stage, there is only a small probability that the next successful
breakthrough will take place in the same institution. This could be because
there are a large number of competing universities working on pushing forward
the same line of research.16
What are the welfare costs associated with early privatization? In the
current version of the model, there are two possible e⁄ects. First, supposing
that the EAF constraint is always satis￿ed, regardless of the timing of the
transition to the private sector (this will be the case if wa = 0), then early
privatization does not prevent a research program from getting started in the
￿rst place. Consequently, its only downside is that it leads to ine¢ ciently high
labor costs. Indeed, in this case, early privatization necessarily raises the ex
16Again, anecdotal evidence￿ such as the Columbia University story mentioned above￿
suggests that revenue maximization has become a very important consideration for some
university technology transfer o¢ ces.
14ante odds that the research program will ultimately bear fruit, but it does so at
a labor cost that is too high relative to the bene￿t.
However, if we do not take for granted that the EAF constraint is always
satis￿ed (because wa > 0), then there can be a second cost of early privati-
zation. In particular, a project that would initially get funded in academia
under the socially optimal transition policy may no longer be worth funding if
it is anticipated that the transition will happen too soon. In this case, the
expectation of early privatization has a more drastic e⁄ect, since it completely
kills o⁄ an otherwise positive-NPV research line.17
3.1.5 Are wage di⁄erentials quantitatively important?
All of the above results hinge on there being a wage di⁄erential between acad-
emia and the private sector. In particular, academic scientists must be willing
to work for lower wages than their private-sector counterparts, because they
value creative freedom. While this assumption ￿ts qualitatively with both ca-
sual observation, as well as with the evidence in Stern (2004) mentioned in the
Introduction, it can reasonably be asked whether real-world wage di⁄erentials
are quantitatively large enough to justify making them the centerpiece of our
theory.
Stern￿ s (2004) estimates￿ which, again, are based on multiple job o⁄ers to
entry-level PhD scientists￿ suggest di⁄erentials on the order of roughly 20 to
30 percent of salary. These are certainly economically signi￿cant di⁄erences,
though perhaps not enormous ones. However, for several reasons, we believe
that a super￿cial glance at these sorts of numbers may lead one to underestimate
the actual importance of academic vs. private-sector cost di⁄erentials.
First, consider Stern￿ s multiple-job-o⁄er methodology. This approach is
attractive, in that it allows one to control for di⁄erences in aptitude across job
candidates. But by its nature, it only reveals the wage di⁄erential for those
types who are ￿on the cusp￿ , in the sense of being willing to entertain both
academic and private-sector jobs. It seems likely that there are more extreme
types for whom the required wage premium to go to the private sector would
be much higher, but who are never observed receiving private-sector o⁄ers.
In the terminology of our model, this amounts to saying that there is het-
erogeneity across scientists in the disutility parameter z. In the presence of
such heterogeneity, the bene￿ts associated with academia are not adequately
summarized by the observed wage di⁄erential. To take an extreme example,
suppose that there are two types of scientists: some who are moderately tal-
ented and who are willing to go to the private sector at a 25 percent wage
17We should be clear about the nature of the thought experiment we have in mind when
we say that early privatization may lead to a violation of the EAF constraint and hence
deter the initiation of a given research line. In this case, we are implicitly assuming that a
social planner makes value-maximizing funding decisions in academia, but takes as given the
ine¢ ciency associated with early privatization. That is, the social planner can be thought
of as a government agency that funds academic research, but that has nothing to say about
either IPR policy, or the behavior of university tech transfer o¢ ces, and hence is unable to do
anything about the timing of transition to the private sector.
15premium, and others who are extremely talented but who would not be will-
ing to go to the private sector at any wage￿ i.e., who have an in￿nite value of
z. The observed wage di⁄erential will be 25 percent, but this does not fully
capture the bene￿ts of academia, since in addition to allowing for the hiring of
moderately-talented scientists at a discount, it also represents the only way to
ever hire extremely-talented scientists.
A second observation is that, as we have cast it, the basic version of the
model understates the total wage bill associated with the private-sector form,
because it assumes away any wages paid to private-sector research supervisors.
Since it is impossible to have the bene￿ts of focus in the private sector without
such supervision, this is a signi￿cant omission if one wants to begin taking the
magnitudes in the model seriously. We model the costs of supervision more
explicitly in Section 5.1 below.
Finally, it should be noted that the ￿branching￿ version of the model in
Section 4 has the potential to greatly lever up the e⁄ects associated with even
relatively modest wage di⁄erentials. In this setting, the costs of higher wages in
the private sector show up not only directly, but also indirectly, in the form of
all the foregone basic research opportunities that might have been undertaken
in a lower-cost academic environment.
While all these points arguably strengthen the case for giving wage di⁄eren-
tials a central role in our theory, we should also point out that the alternative
￿experimentation￿version of the model in Section 6 does not rely at all on wage
di⁄erentials￿ indeed, it assumes that wages in academia and the private sector
are identical. At the same time, it still shares the general theme that the
creative control associated with academia is particularly valuable in the early
stages of a research program, while the focus associated with the private sector
is more valuable later on.
3.1.6 Two examples
To conclude this subsection, we present two numerical examples to illustrate
our results:
Example 1: Set R = wa = 0, z = 2, ￿ = 0:5 (implying that wp = 1),
p = 0:45, V = 100, and k = 6. Under the optimal transition policy, the
￿rst two stages are in academia, and the last four are in the private sector.
This optimal policy yields an ex ante expected payo⁄ of 0.12, and an ex ante
probability of success of 0.0021. Under early privatization, the ￿rst stage is
in academia, and the last ￿ve are in the private sector. Early privatization
yields an ex ante expected payo⁄ of 0.01, and an ex ante probability of success
of 0.0042.
Example 2: Keep all the other parameters the same as in the previous
example, but set wa = 0:05, while keeping wp = 1. (This corresponds to R =
0:05 and z = 1:90.) Under the optimal transition policy, the ￿rst two stages
are again in academia, and the last four are in the private sector. This optimal
policy yields an ex ante expected payo⁄ of 0.06, and an ex ante probability of
16success of 0.0021. Under early privatization, the expectation that the project
will move to the private sector after the ￿rst stage leads to a violation of the
EAF constraint, so the research program never gets initiated.
3.1.7 Summary
Let us summarize the main messages from the model thus far. First of all,
academia has an important role to play in the early stages of a research line:
it is in general neither socially optimal, nor even feasible, to have early-stage
research conducted in the private sector. Second, relative to a socially optimal
transition policy, there are two types of costs associated with early privatization:
i) ine¢ ciently high labor costs; and ii) an increased likelihood of violating the
EAF constraint, thereby preventing the research line from ever getting o⁄ the
ground.
We should note one e⁄ect which is conspicuously absent from this version of
the model. Conditional on the EAF constraint being satis￿ed, early privatiza-
tion can never reduce the ex ante probability of success. That is, conditional
on the project getting started in the ￿rst place, early privatization is necessarily
a force in favor of innovation, with the only downside being that this comes at
an ine¢ ciently high labor cost. It turns out that this particular feature is an
artifact of our simplifying assumption that the number of researchers at each
stage is always equal to one. As we now show, when n is made endogenous in a
more reasonable way, early privatization can stymie innovation even conditional
on the project getting o⁄ the ground. This is because the higher labor costs
associated with early privatization can now lead to a reduction in the number
of scientists employed at a given stage in the private sector.
3.2 Independent draws: ￿(n) = (1 ￿ (1 ￿ p)n)
3.2.1 Analysis
As before, to solve the social planner￿ s problem, we work backward from stage k.
If the last round of research is conducted in the private sector, and n scientists




k) = (1 ￿ (1 ￿ p)n)V ￿ nwp: (17)
Ignoring integer problems, the ￿rm￿ s ￿rst order condition implies that the
optimal number of scientists, n
p
k, is given by:
n
p
k = (log(￿V=wp))=￿; (18)
where we have de￿ned ￿ = ￿log(1 ￿ p) > 0. It follows that at the optimum,
expected stage-k private sector pro￿t is:
E(￿
p￿
k ) = V ￿ (wp=￿)(1 + log(￿V=wp)): (19)
17If instead the last round of research is conducted in academia, and n scientists
are hired, the expected payo⁄ is:
E(￿a
k) = (1 ￿ (1 ￿ p)n)￿V ￿ nwa: (20)
If we imagine that the number of academic scientists is also set at an optimal
level￿ i.e., a well-intentioned government agency chooses the aggregate level of
research funding across all universities￿ then we have:
na
k = (log(￿￿V=wa))=￿: (21)
Note that the optimal number of academic scientists na
k can be either greater
than or less than the optimal number of private sector scientists, n
p
k. This is
because academic scientists are simultaneously cheaper, but less productive. At
the optimum, expected stage-k pro￿t in academia is:
E(￿a￿
k ) = ￿V ￿ (wa=￿)(1 + log(￿￿V=wa)): (22)
Denote the maximum of E(￿
p￿
k ) and E(￿a￿
k ) by ￿k. Proceeding recursively,
it follows that at any earlier stage i, we have:
E(￿
p￿
i ) = ￿i+1 ￿ (wp=￿)(1 + log(￿￿i+1=wp)); (23)
and
E(￿a￿
i ) = ￿￿i+1 ￿ (wa=￿)(1 + log(￿￿￿i+1=wa)): (24)
In the appendix, we prove the following analog to Lemma 1:
Lemma 2: Suppose that E(￿
p￿
k ) > E(￿a￿
k ), so that it is optimal to locate
the last stage (i.e., stage k) in the private sector. From the perspective of a
social planner, there is a unique transition point i￿, such that it is optimal for
stage i￿ to be the ￿rst stage conducted in the private sector. This transition
point i￿ is the smallest value of i that satis￿es E(￿
p￿
i ) > E(￿a￿
i ), where these
two quantities are de￿ned by the recursive equations (23) and (24).
By contrast to the social optimum, to solve for the transition point under
early privatization, we simply keep folding backwards to earlier stages, always
staying in the private sector. If k is large enough, we will eventually hit a
stage ie such that E(￿
p￿
ie ) > 0, but E(￿
p￿
ie￿1) = 0. The latter condition obtains
when (￿￿ie=wp) < 1, so that at stage ie ￿1, a private sector ￿rm is at a corner
solution, with n
p
k = 0. It then follows that ie is the earliest stage at which an
idea is viable in the private sector￿ if an idea were to somehow accidentally wind
up in the private sector earlier, no ￿rm would ever invest positive resources in
it.18
18Even when an idea is not viable in the private sector at stage ie￿1, it can nevertheless be
viable in academia at this stage, provided that (￿￿￿ie=wa) > 1. Thus a necessary condition
for academia to be viable at an earlier stage than the private sector is that (￿=wa > 1=wp),
which can be re-written as ￿z > R. This is the same necessary condition that we stated
above for the version of the model with n = 1 at all stages.
183.2.2 An additional bene￿t of academia
The following example￿ which is spelled out in more detail in Table 1￿ illustrates
the additional positive scale e⁄ect associated with academic research that arises
when n is endogenous. The example also shows how this scale e⁄ect alters
the welfare comparison between the socially optimal transition policy and early
privatization.
Example 3: Set R = wa = 0, z = 1, ￿ = 0:5 (implying that wp = 0:5),
p = 0:10, V = 100, and k = 8. Under the optimal transition policy, the
￿rst three stages are in academia, and the last ￿ve are in the private sector.
This optimal policy yields an ex ante expected payo⁄ of 2.08, and an ex ante
probability of success of 0.078. Under early privatization, the ￿rst stage is in
academia, and the last seven are in the private sector. Early privatization
yields an ex ante expected payo⁄ of 0.06, and an ex ante probability of success
of 0.044.
The key feature of the example is that early privatization now not only lowers
the ex ante expected payo⁄ (by de￿nition) it also lowers the ex ante probability
that, conditional on the research line getting started, it will ultimately bear
fruit. This is because now, with variable n, when the idea is privatized early,
relatively few scientists are hired to work on it in the initial private-sector stages,
as compared to the number that would be hired in academia. Consequently,
the success probabilities for the initial private-sector stages are relatively low.
In the context of the example, if the idea moves to the private sector early, at
k = 2, only n = 2:1 scientists are hired, yielding a probability of success at this
stage of 0:20. By contrast, if the idea stays in academia for the second stage,
an in￿nite number of researchers are hired (since wa = 0), yielding a probability
of success at this stage of 0:50.
From a policy perspective, the example suggests that increased early-stage
IPR protection need not always be bene￿cial to the innovation process. In par-
ticular, if it was legally impossible to protect the IPR associated with stage-2 and
stage-3 ideas, then privatization could never happen before the socially-optimal
transition point, and the ex ante probability of obtaining a successful product
would necessarily be increased. This general feature￿ a non-monotonicity of in-
novation probabilities with respect to the degree of IPR protection￿ also recurs
in several variations of the model that we present below.19
4 Alternative Strategies Create New Lines
Thus far, we have assumed that at each stage there is only one economically
legitimate research strategy￿ namely the practical strategy, which has the poten-
19If there was no IPR protection at any stage, the entire line would have to be located
in academia, leading to an ex ante probability of success of only 0:004 for the parameters
in Example 3, much lower than in even the early-privatization case. So clearly, while some
relaxation of early-stage IPR protection may be socially valuable, IPR protection in the later
stages of a research line is absolutely essential.
19tial to advance the project to the next stage along the chain. In contrast, the
alternative strategy has been taken to be nothing more than worthless puzzle-
solving. Now we modify this assumption. While we keep the restriction that
only the practical strategy helps to advance the current line of research, we now
allow the alternative strategy to yield new insights which may spawn wholly
di⁄erent lines of research. The interpretation is that when scientists turn away
from the applied task of pushing the current line forward, they may not be shirk-
ing per se, but rather taking a useful step back that may ultimately generate
fundamental breakthroughs.
To embed this notion into our model, we proceed as follows. We keep all
the same assumptions as before, with one modi￿cation. Now, if at any stage
of the original research line, a scientist works on the alternative strategy, there
is a probability pr of a revolutionary new idea which will form the basis for ￿
entirely new ￿o⁄spring￿ research lines, with ￿ ￿ 1. Each of these o⁄spring
lines has the same properties as the single lines analyzed above, although we
allow for the possibility that the o⁄spring have a greater number of stages than
the original line, i.e., that ko ￿ k. Moreover, for computational simplicity
but without any major loss of insight, we assume that the o⁄spring lines are
themselves sterile, and cannot give rise to further generations of revolutionary
ideas. That is, revolutionary ideas that yield o⁄spring can only come from the
alternative strategy applied at some stage of the original parent line.
In order to make things interesting, we assume that an o⁄spring line has
su¢ ciently many stages ko that it is not viable if it is born into the private
sector. This just means that the early-privatization point for an o⁄spring line,
ie
o, exceeds one, or that:
pkoV ￿ (1 + p + :::pko￿1)wp < 0 (25)
This assumption ensures that private-sector entrepreneurs will continue to direct
scientists to stay away from the alternative strategy, and to focus all their e⁄orts
on the practical strategy, no matter how large ￿ is. Simply put, the assumption
implies that the private sector never has any use for the o⁄spring lines generated
by the alternative strategy, because these lines are so early-stage that they are
negative-NPV when evaluated at private-sector wages.20
In contrast, we assume that an o⁄spring line is viable if it is born in academia,
and managed optimally from that point on. That is, denoting the ex ante value
of an o⁄spring line under optimal management by ￿￿
o, we assume that ￿￿
o > 0.
Using a logic similar to that above, we can derive the socially-optimal tran-
sition point for the parent line, i￿
p. We do this ￿rst for the perfectly corre-
lated draws case where n = 1, and then for the independent draws case where
￿(n) = (1 ￿ (1 ￿ p)n).
20For the purposes of this section, we are implicitly assuming that the private sector is
unable to sell the rights to o⁄spring lines back to academia. This could be, e.g., because no
single university, acting as a revenue maximizer, would be willing to pay much for an idea:
each university knows that it is going to take multiple stages for the idea to be su¢ ciently
advanced as to be ready for resale to the private sector, at which point the ￿nal academic
breakthrough is likely to occur in another university.
204.1 Perfectly correlated draws: n = 1
Lemma 3: From the perspective of a social planner, there is a unique transition
point i￿
p, such that it is optimal for stage i￿
p to be the ￿rst stage of the parent
line conducted in the private sector. This transition point i￿
p is the smallest
value of i that satis￿es:
p￿i+1 > z + pr￿￿￿
o: (26)
The logic is identical to that of Lemma 1 in the basic model, and the expres-
sion for the optimal transition point is the same, except that a pr￿￿￿
o term has
been added to the right-hand side of the inequality. The intuition is straight-
forward. In the basic model, it is optimal to make the transition to the private
sector once the increase in value that comes from a higher probability of mov-
ing to the next stage is su¢ cient to outweigh the private-sector wage premium.
Now, in addition to this wage premium, there is a second cost of moving to the
private-sector￿ the fact that o⁄spring lines are never developed. Or said di⁄er-
ently, academia now has the added bene￿t of letting many more ￿ owers bloom,
which makes it optimal to wait longer before moving to the private sector, all
else equal.
The early-privatization transition point, ie
p, is identical to that in the basic
model. This is because once privatized, the remaining payo⁄s from the parent
line are unchanged from before, as scientists are still always assigned to the
practical strategy. Comparing the socially-optimal transition point and the
early-privatization transition point, we have:
Proposition 4: For the case of n = 1, the gap between the socially-optimal
transition point for the parent line and the early-privatization transition point,
given by (i￿
p ￿ ie
p), is greater than in the basic model, and is increasing in the
productivity pr￿ of the of the alternative strategy.
Example 4: Set R = wa = 0, z = 2, ￿ = 0:5 (implying that wp = 1),
p = 0:45, V = 100 for both the parent and o⁄spring lines. Further assume that
the parent line has k = 5 stages, that all o⁄spring have ko = 6 stages, and that
pr = 1 and ￿ = 20 for the parent line. Under the optimal transition policy, the
￿rst two stages of the parent line are in academia, and the last three are in the
private sector. (By contrast, with ￿ = 0, only the ￿rst stage of the line is in
academia under the optimal transition policy.) The optimal policy yields an ex
ante expected payo⁄ of 1:85, and an expected number of successfully completed
products equal to 0:1189. Under early privatization, all ￿ve stages of the parent
line are in the private sector, which implies that there are never any o⁄spring
lines. Early privatization yields an ex ante expected payo⁄ of 0:06, and an
expected number of successfully completed products equal to 0:0185.
The example demonstrates two points. First, having ￿ > 0 increases the
divergence between the optimal transition point and the early-privatization tran-
sition point; this is just a concrete illustration of Proposition 4. Second it is
21now possible to have a substantially lower rate of innovation￿ de￿ned in terms of
the ex ante expected number of research lines that reach successful completion￿
under early privatization than under the optimal policy, even when we restrict
ourselves to the case where n = 1. Once again, this latter result suggests that
it may be possible to increase the overall level of innovation in the economy by
relaxing early-stage IPR protection. In the context of the example, innovation
would be boosted if it were impossible to protect stage-1 ideas, so that stage-1
research could only be done in academia. This version of the model thus o⁄ers
a particular rationalization of the ￿anti-commons￿e⁄ect pointed out by Heller
and Eisenberg (1998).
4.2 Independent draws: ￿(n) = (1 ￿ (1 ￿ p)n)
The e⁄ect of adding o⁄spring lines into the independent-draws version of the
model is qualitatively similar to that in the correlated-draws case. In the
appendix, we prove a direct analog to Proposition 4:
Proposition 5: For the case of ￿(n) = (1 ￿ (1 ￿ p)n), the gap between the
socially-optimal transition point for the parent line and the early-privatization
transition point, given by (i￿
p ￿ ie
p), is greater than in the basic model, and is
increasing in the productivity pr￿ of the of the alternative strategy.
Example 5: Set R = wa = 0, z = 1, ￿ = 0:5 (implying that wp = 0:5), p =
0:10, V = 100, and k = 8. (Note that these are all the same parameter values
as in Example 3.) Further assume that all o⁄spring also have ko = 8 stages,
and that pr = 0:10 and ￿ = 10 for the parent line. Under the optimal transition
policy, the ￿rst ￿ve stages of the parent line are in academia, and the last three
are in the private sector. This optimal policy yields an ex ante expected payo⁄
of 21.58, and an expected number of successfully completed products equal to
2.02. Under early privatization, the ￿rst stage of the parent line is in academia,
and the last seven are in the private sector. Early privatization yields an ex
ante expected payo⁄ of 0.36, and an expected number of successfully completed
products equal to 0.26.
The contrast between Example 3 and Example 5￿ the details of which appear
in Table 2￿ provides a clean illustration of the impact that o⁄spring lines have
on our normative comparisons. In Example 3, early privatization was seen to
reduce the rate of innovation by 44 percent, as compared to the socially optimal
transition policy (0.044 vs. 0.078). In Example 5, with everything else the
same but for the addition of the o⁄spring lines, early privatization reduces the
rate of innovation by 87 percent (0.26 vs. 2.02).
4.3 Empirical implications of the branching model
From an empirical perspective, what is perhaps most interesting about the cur-
rent version of the model is that it implies that once an idea becomes the
property of a private ￿rm, it will be developed along relatively narrow lines.
22That is, the private sector￿ s ownership of a given idea will not yield as diverse
an array of useful next-generation ideas as would be generated in academia.
This implication seems to ￿t with the broad spirit of recent empirical work
by Kaplan, Sensoy and Stromberg (2005). They study the life-cycle evolution
of 49 venture-capital-backed ￿rms, beginning with their ￿rst business plans, and
continuing until three years after these ￿rms have gone public. The ￿rms in
their sample are largely in high-technology industries, with the vast majority
coming from either the biotechnology or software/information-technology sec-
tors. Perhaps the most striking of Kaplan et al￿ s ￿ndings is the extent to which
these innovative ￿rms stick to their original business plans, and do not branch
o⁄ into other lines of business. As they put it:
￿While the companies grow dramatically, their business models or
core businesses are remarkably stable. Only one ￿rm changes its
core line of business over the sample period.￿
Although the results of Kaplan, Sensoy and Stromberg (2005) are suggestive,
they hardly represent a sharp test of the theory. In order to create such a test,
one would ideally like to ￿nd a source of exogenous variation in the extent to
which ideas get taken private. One could then use patent-citation data to
see if, e.g., ideas which get taken private earlier are cited by a narrower set of
next-generation patents. We hope to explore this hypothesis in future work.
5 Hybrid Organizational Forms
Thus far, our renditions of academia and the private sector have been extreme
caricatures. At one end of the spectrum, we have cast the private sector as an
organizational form in which scientists have no freedom of choice whatsoever,
and are always forced to follow a research strategy dictated by an entrepre-
neur/supervisor, whether they like this strategy or not. At the other end of the
spectrum, we have cast academia as a setting in which researchers not only have
absolute creative control, but also face no incentives￿ either explicit or implicit￿
that might encourage them to pursue a relatively more practical strategy.
We now discuss how each of these extreme assumptions might be relaxed.
Doing so leads to a more nuanced and realistic view of both organizational forms,
though it does not alter the main message of our model. In what follows, we
focus on the basic version of the model from Section 3, and on the expositionally
simpler case where n = 1 at all stages.
5.1 Less authoritarian private-sector ￿rms
Many private-sector ￿rms are known for taking explicit measures to give some
of their research-oriented employees a degree of creative independence. For ex-
ample, both 3M and Google apparently allow certain employees one day a week
to pursue their own research interests.21 In an e⁄ort to model this behavior,
21We thank Rebecca Henderson for suggesting these examples.
23we follow Aghion and Tirole (1997) and draw a distinction between formal and
real authority in private-sector ￿rms. The idea is that while the entrepreneur
in a private ￿rm always retains the formal right to direct her employees￿ by,
e.g., choosing the type of lab equipment they work with￿ she may in fact choose
not to exercise this right if she is not su¢ ciently informed to know which is the
better strategy.
Suppose that a project is located in the private sector at stage i. The
timing of events is now as follows. First, the entrepreneur hires a scientist,
and agrees to pay him a wage of wpi. Next, the entrepreneur invests e⁄ort in
trying to become informed about the project. For an e⁄ort cost of ￿￿
2=2, the
entrepreneur has a probability ￿ of becoming informed. If she is informed, she
is then able to force the scientist to follow the practical strategy, as we have been
assuming above. However, if she is uninformed, the entrepreneur is unable to
direct the scientist, and the scientist is thus free to do what he wants, just as in
academia.
Observe that the basic version of the model in Section 3 is just a special
case of this one, in which ￿ = 0, so that the entrepreneur always chooses to
become informed with probability ￿ = 1. It is also worth noting that this
modeling framework could be used to explicitly link the precommitment function
of academia to its non-pro￿t nature: if academic administrators (e.g., deans,
or a university president) do not get pro￿t-linked compensation, they will be
unwilling to expend any e⁄ort on becoming informed, leading to a situation in
which ￿ = 0￿ i.e., in which real authority always rests with individual scientists.




i j informed) = p￿i+1 ￿ wpi: (27)
The payo⁄ to the entrepreneur if she is uninformed at stage i is:
E(￿
p
i j uninformed) = ￿p￿i+1 ￿ wpi: (28)
Therefore, the marginal value of being informed at stage i is (1 ￿ ￿)p￿i+1,
and the entrepreneur￿ s equilibrium probability of becoming informed at this
stage is:
￿i = (1 ￿ ￿)p￿i+1=￿: (29)
It follows that the unconditional expected payo⁄ at stage i in the private
sector is given by:
E(￿
p
i) = (￿i + ￿(1 ￿ ￿i))p￿i+1 ￿ wpi ￿ ￿￿
2
i=2; (30)
where the wage wpi is itself determined as:
wpi = R + ￿i(1 ￿ ￿)z: (31)
With equation (30) taking the place of equation (8), the rest of the analysis
from Section 3.1 continues to apply as stated. In particular, both the socially
optimal transition point and the early privatization point are determined using
24the same approach as before. A couple of new empirical implications are worth
noting, however. First, from (29), as the project moves closer to completion,
the likelihood that the entrepreneur becomes informed and imposes her will
on the scientist increases, since ￿i+1 goes up. It then follows from (31) that
the scientist￿ s wage also increases, to compensate for the fact that he has less
de facto creative control. In other words, private-sector ￿rms endogenously
become more authoritarian￿ and less like academia￿ as research projects move
into their later stages.
Moreover, the model makes it clear that, even though we may observe some
private-sector ￿rms behaving in a less-than-fully authoritarian manner (e.g.,
the 3Ms and Googles of the world), it does not follow that there is no role for
academia. Since the private-sector wage is set before the entrepreneur exerts
e⁄ort to become informed, there is still a commitment problem in the private
sector: while the probability of authority being exercised may be less than one,
it can still be ine¢ ciently high in the early stages of a research program. Thus
the precommitment associated with academia remains valuable.
Example 6: Set R = wa = 0, z = 2, ￿ = 0:5, p = 0:45, V = 100, and
k = 6. In addition, assume that for a cost of c = 4, the entrepreneur has
a probability ￿ = 1 of becoming informed, while for zero cost the entrepreneur
has a probability ￿ = 0:5 of becoming informed. Under the optimal transition
policy, the ￿rst three stages are in academia, the third stage is in the private
sector with ￿moderate￿authoritarianism (￿ = 0:5) and a wage of wp = 0:5, and
the ￿nal two stages are in the private sector with full authoritarianism (￿ = 1)
and a wage of wp = 1. This optimal policy yields an ex ante expected payo⁄
of 0.04. Under early privatization, the ￿rst two stages are in academia, the
next two stages are in the private sector with moderate authoritarianism, and
the ￿nal two stages are in the private sector with full authoritarianism. Early
privatization yields an ex ante expected payo⁄ of 0.03.
5.2 Low-powered incentives in academia
In modeling academia, we have assumed that scientists are completely free to
follow their preferences, and face no incentives￿ either explicit or implicit￿ that
might push them in the direction of the practical strategy. Although the tenure
system can certainly be thought of as blunting the implicit incentives associated
with career concerns (Holmstrom (1999)), it is nevertheless hard to argue that
tenured academics face no incentives whatsoever. For example, scientists can
earn both professional prestige and monetary prizes if their work is highly cited,
and citations in turn are likely to have some relationship (albeit a noisy one) to
the underlying usefulness of the research.
To introduce a meaningful role for incentives in academia, we generalize the
model slightly, so that the disutility that a scientist experiences from following
his less-favored strategy is now a random variable that can take on one of two
values: zLwith probability !; and zH > zL with probability (1 ￿ !). The
25outcome of this random variable is independent of everything else in the model,
and it has a mean of !zL + (1 ￿ !)zH = z.
Now suppose we want to design an incentive scheme that induces a scientist
to follow the practical strategy when his disutility from doing so is zL, but not
when it is zH. This scheme will have to have two properties. First, incentive
compatibility requires that the scientist receive an expected bonus equal to zL
(say in the form of expected prize winnings) whenever he follows the practical
strategy, which happens with probability (￿+(1￿￿)!). Second, the scientist￿ s
participation constraint requires that the ex ante expected wage be equal to at
least R + (1 ￿ ￿)!zL, to compensate him for the (1 ￿ ￿)! probability that he
winds up following the practical strategy in a state of the world when it is not
his favorite.22
Putting it all together, the ex ante expected wage bill for an academic sci-
entist is now given by:
wa = maxfR + (1 ￿ ￿)!zL; (￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)!)zLg: (32)
And as noted, with this incentive scheme the probability that an academic
scientist pursues the practical strategy is now increased to (￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)!).
Everything in the private sector remains exactly as before: the wage wp =
R + (1 ￿ ￿)z, and the scientist always follows the practical strategy.
It is clear that if zL is close to zero, academia with this particular incentive
scheme can be preferred to academia without incentives: the added wage cost
is minimal, but there can be a meaningful increase (by an amount (1 ￿ ￿)!) in
the probability that the practical strategy is undertaken. At the same time, it
can never make sense to try to use more powerful incentives to induce academic
scientists to always follow the practical strategy, even when their aversion to it
is strong (i.e., given by zH instead of zL). This is because the ex ante cost of
such higher-powered incentives would be:
wa = maxfR + (1 ￿ ￿)z; zHg ￿ wp: (33)
with the inequality being strict if zH > R + (1 ￿ ￿)z, which is the case so long
as R is not too large.
In other words, if we are in the late stages of a research program, and it
is important to always have scientists working on the practical strategy, this
is more e¢ ciently accomplished in the private sector, where they can simply
be compelled to do so, rather than in academia, where this behavior has to
be elicited by a system of high-powered incentives.23 At the same time, the
22It should be emphasized that we are e⁄ectively making the best possible case for incentives
in academia, by allowing bonuses to be tied directly to strategy choice. In reality, academic
incentives are likely to be more general in nature, and much less directly linked to the ultimate
commercial value of a research project. In this sense, our basic model, which omits academic
incentives entirely, may actually be closer to capturing the truth.
23Note that this same logic also implies that if z is non-stochastic, there is no role for
incentives in academia. Thus we have e⁄ectively endogenized the no-incentives assumption
that we made about academia in the course of developing the basic model.
26combination of an academic environment with some relatively low-powered in-
centives can be more e¢ cient than the private sector in the early stages of a
research program. The appeal of such a combination is that it gently nudges
those with only a mild aversion to the practical strategy in the right direction,
while leaving creative independence to those who value it the most.
The bottom line from this exercise is that our basic conclusions are robust
to the introduction of some form of incentives in academia. At the same time,
the model also suggests that to the extent that such incentives exist, it probably
makes sense for them to be relatively low-powered.
6 How Academia Fosters Experimentation
In this section, we explore the hypothesis that academia encourages econom-
ically valuable experimentation by scientists. The basic story is as follows.
Individual scientists know more than entrepreneurs about the right way to at-
tack a given problem. Moreover, their incentives are inherently well aligned, in
the sense that, all else equal, they get more utility from adopting an approach
that is likely to be successful. Hence if left alone in the early stages of a re-
search line, scientists will naturally tend to adopt research strategies that are
responsive to their private information. This in turn has bene￿ts for the later
stages of the line, particularly if these later stages are located in the private
sector, since now private-sector entrepreneurs can piggyback on the previously-
generated information and thereby do a better job of directing the scientists
that they manage.
However, this line of argument raises an obvious question: if later-stage
private-sector research bene￿ts from the information generated by earlier-stage
experimentation, why wouldn￿ t a private-sector ￿rm that owns an idea at an
early stage simply adopt a hands-o⁄policy, and let scientists do what they want?
In other words, if experimentation is value-enhancing, why doesn￿ t the private
sector have the right incentives to pursue experimentation, thereby rendering
academia unnecessary?
The answer again has to do with the inability of the private sector to pre-
commit to not interfering with scientists. In particular, suppose that some
research strategies are simply easier for an entrepreneur to meddle with once
they are underway, perhaps because the entrepreneur is more familiar with the
underlying technology. In this case, a scientist operating in the private sector
faces a tension in deciding which strategy to pursue: he can either follow his
private information and choose the strategy that he thinks is most likely to
succeed, or he can choose the strategy that is least likely to lead to meddling
on the part of the entrepreneur. As a result, even if private-sector ￿rms allow
scientists to choose their research strategies, these choices may no longer re￿ ect
the scientists￿private information in the desired fashion.24
24This logic is similar to that in Stein (2002), who argues that individual agents will have
less incentive to produce valuable soft information when they work in a hierarchical setting
and do not have control rights. See also Dessein (2002), who makes the point that an agent
276.1 Basic setup
Consider again the variant of our basic model with n = 1, and to keep things
especially simple, set the number of stages k = 2. As before, scientists can
pursue two alternative strategies at each stage, but now either strategy may be
practical with some probability. Let S1 and S2 denote the two strategies. There
are two possible states of nature, state 1 and state 2, and, importantly, the same
state persists across both stages of the research line. The state is observed by
individual scientists, but not by private-sector entrepreneurs.
Both the probability of success of a given strategy, as well as the utility
it yields to the scientist, depend on two factors: i) the state of nature; and
ii) the extent to which an entrepreneur intervenes in the strategy once it is
underway. Moreover, there is an asymmetry across the two strategies, in that
the entrepreneur has the ability to intervene in S1, but not in S2. This could
be, e.g., because strategy S1 is more conventional, and uses a technology that
is more widely familiar to non-scientists.
In state 1, which occurs with probability s > 1
2; strategy S1 is the generally
more promising of the two. However, once a scientist gets started on strategy
S1 in state 1, the entrepreneur can further increase the likelihood of success
by meddling￿ i.e., by forcing the scientist to go about strategy S1 in a very
particular way. While such intervention raises the odds of success, it also
reduces the utility that the scientist derives from his work, to the point that he
will prefer to adopt strategy S2 instead, since the entrepreneur never meddles
in S2:
Denote the probabilities of success in state 1 under strategy S1 with and
without meddling by prob(S1;m j state1) and prob(S1;nm j state1) respectively,
and denote the probability of success in state 1 under strategy S2 by prob(S2 j
state1). Similarly, denote the associated utilities derived by the scientist by
u(S1;m j state1), u(S1;nm j state1) and u(S2 j state1). We assume that:
prob(S1;m j state1) = h > prob(S1;nm j state1) = p > prob(S2 j state1) = q
(34)
and
u(S1;nm j state1) = 0 > u(S2 j state1) = ￿z=2 > u(S1;m j state1) = ￿z:
(35)
In state 2, which occurs with probability (1￿s); strategy S2 is the one that
maximizes both the probability of success and the scientist￿ s utility, whereas S1
is both less promising and less desirable for the scientist, all the more so when
accompanied by meddling. Thus we have:
prob(S2 j state2) = p > prob(S1;m j state2) = prob(S1;nm j state2) = q (36)
and
who does not have control rights will not want to reveal information to a principal, since the
principal cannot commit not to use this information in her own interest.
28u(S2 j state2) = 0 > u(S1;nm j state2) = ￿z=2 > u(S1;m j state2) = ￿z:
(37)
Again, absent meddling, the scientist prefers to work on strategies that are
likely to be successful (S1 in state 1 and S2 in state 2) but he also values
independence enough that he would rather pursue the less promising strategy
S2 in state 1 in order to avoid meddling by the entrepreneur.
6.2 Strategy choice in academia and the private sector
If the project is located in the private sector, the timing of the stage game
between the entrepreneur and the scientist can be described as follows. First,
the entrepreneur decides whether to allocate authority over the choice of strategy
to herself or to the scientist. Next, if the choice of strategy is delegated to the
scientist, he observes the state of nature and then makes his decision. Finally,
if the scientist opts for strategy S1, the entrepreneur chooses whether or not to
meddle. The key assumption here is that the entrepreneur cannot commit not
to meddle once the scientist has chosen strategy S1.
With these assumptions in place, it is easy to describe the solution to the
stage game.
Lemma 4: Suppose that stage 1 is located in the private sector. Then even
when granted the authority to pick his research strategy, the scientist will not
reveal the true state of nature through his choice.
Proof: Suppose that the true state is state 1. If the scientist reveals the
state by selecting strategy S1, the entrepreneur will meddle, since this is the
ex post optimal thing for her to do￿ it maximizes the probability of success￿ and
she cannot commit to do otherwise. But then the scientist￿ s utility is ￿z.
If the scientist instead selects strategy S2, her utility is higher, at ￿z=2. So
independent of the state of nature, the scientist always chooses strategy S2 when
he works in the private sector.
Corollary: Suppose that stage 1 is located in the private sector. Then it is
optimal for the entrepreneur to retain authority over strategy choice, to always
impose strategy S1, and then to meddle.
Proof: The corollary follows immediately from the preceding lemma and
from the fact that by unconditionally imposing S1 followed by meddling, the
entrepreneur achieves a probability of success of (sh+(1￿s)q), which is greater
than the probability (sq + (1 ￿ s)p) that comes from unconditionally imposing
S2.
Thus it is impossible to sustain experimentation in the private sector. Know-
ing that the scientist will never condition his strategy on his private information
when faced with the threat of meddling, the best the entrepreneur can do is to
unconditionally impose the strategy with the higher prior probability of success,
i.e., S1. In contrast, academia is more friendly to experimentation:
29Proposition 6: The scientist will reveal the state of nature through his
choice of research strategy at stage 1 if and only if stage 1 is located in academia.
Proof: If stage 1 is located in academia, then the scientist never has to
worry about meddling. Therefore, he maximizes his utility by picking strategy
S1 in state 1 and strategy S2 in state 2.
Again, the key advantage of academia is precommitment￿ in this case, the
precommitment not to meddle once the scientist has selected strategy S1. The
private sector￿ s inability to precommit in this way is its one weakness as an
organizational form.
6.3 The optimal organization of research
With only two stages in the research line, there are four possible organizational
structures to be considered: (i) private sector at both stages 1 and 2 (which
we refer to as pp); (ii) academia at both stages 1 and 2 (which we refer to as
aa); (iii) academia at stage 1 followed by the private sector at stage 2 (which
we refer to as ap); and (iv) private sector at stage 1 followed by academia at
stage 2 (which we refer to as pa). To further simplify the analysis, we consider
the case where the scientist￿ s disutility parameter z is negligibly small compared
to the value V of a successful line. This allows us to think of wages in both
academia and the private sector as being e⁄ectively equal to zero, and therefore
to ignore wages in what follows￿ unlike in prior sections of the paper, wages no
longer play a critical role in this version of the model.
Under structure pp; we know from the previous subsection that the entre-
preneur always imposes strategy S1 followed by meddling. If it is state 1, this
leads to a probability of success of h in each of the two stages, so that the overall
probability of success is h2: If it is state 2, the probability of success in each of
the two stages is q; so that the overall probability of success is q2. Since state
1 occurs with probability s, we have that the ex ante value of the line under
structure pp is equal to:
￿pp = (sh2 + (1 ￿ s)q2)V: (38)
Under structure aa; the scientist chooses strategy Sj in state j at both stages.
According to our above assumptions, this means that the probability of success
at any stage, and in either state of nature, is given by p. So the ex ante value
of the line is equal to:
￿aa = (sp2 + (1 ￿ s)p2)V = p2V: (39)
Note that under the ￿rst two structures, there is no informational spillover
across the two stages. This is no longer the case under structure ap; since the
revelation of the true state of nature at stage 1 under academia now increases the
expected value of the line when it moves from academia to the private sector. If
state 1 prevails at stage 1, the scientist chooses S1￿ since academia protects him
against meddling￿ and without meddling this choice of strategy leads to success
30with probability p. Then, having learned the true state from observing the
academic strategy in stage 1, the entrepreneur at stage 2 will choose to impose
strategy S1 followed by meddling, which in turn leads to success at stage 2 with
probability h. The overall probability of success corresponding to this sequence
of events is thus ph: If instead state 2 prevails at stage 1, the scientist chooses
S2; which leads to success with probability p. Having learned the true state, the
entrepreneur will then impose S2 at stage 2, which again leads to success with
probability p. The overall probability of success corresponding to this sequence
of events is p2. So the ex ante value of the line under structure ap is equal to:
￿ap = (sph + (1 ￿ s)p2)V: (40)
Finally, under structure pa, logic similar to that above implies that the ex
ante value of the line is given by:
￿pa = (sph + (1 ￿ s)qp)V: (41)
Comparing the expected payo⁄s across the four structures, we obtain the
following results. First, the ap structure strictly dominates both the pa struc-
ture (since p > q), as well as the aa structure (since h > p). The reason is that
ap makes it possible to ￿rst learn the state of nature under academia at stage 1,
and then to use this information to direct researchers at stage 2. In contrast,
it can never make sense to locate the project in academia at the second stage,
because this precludes ex post e¢ cient intervention by the entrepreneur, and
because there is no further value to information beyond stage 2.
Second, the ap structure is preferred to the pp structure whenever:
sh(h ￿ p) < (1 ￿ s)(p2 ￿ q2): (42)
The left hand side of this inequality re￿ ects the value of having the entrepreneur
meddle in strategy S1 at stage 1. The right hand side re￿ ects the value of the
information produced in academia at stage 1. When the latter exceeds the
former, it is better to locate the ￿rst stage of the research line in academia.
This is more likely to be the case as s falls towards 1
2, since a smaller s means
that there is more ex ante uncertainty about the state of nature, and hence
more to be learned in academia.
It should be noted that the inequality is independent of V , and does not
have anything to do with wage di⁄erentials, since wages in both academia and
the private sector have been set to zero. In other words, the rationale here
for locating the ￿rst stage of the research in academia is distinct from that
emphasized in previous sections. Nevertheless, the broad theme of the paper
continues to apply: the fundamental tradeo⁄ between academia and the private
sector is the tradeo⁄ between creative control and directedness. And creative
control tends to be more valuable in the early stages of a research line, while
directedness tends to be more valuable later on.
With wages set to zero, the pp structure will always be positive-NPV, even
if it is dominated by ap. Or said di⁄erently, a private-sector ￿rm can always
31a⁄ord to make a non-zero bid for the research line prior to stage 1. Thus we
have:
Proposition 7: Suppose that sh(h ￿ p) < (1 ￿ s)(p2 ￿ q2). Then the
socially optimal policy is to have the ￿rst stage of the research line located in
academia, and the second stage located in the private sector. However, under
early privatization, both stages are located in the private sector.
7 Connection to the Literature
What is the role of academia in the innovation process? One common answer is
that because of knowledge spillovers and imperfect IPR protection, the economic
value associated with certain kinds of ideas cannot be fully appropriated by the
developers of these ideas, leading to private-sector underinvestment￿ hence the
need for public funding of such ￿basic￿research (Nelson (1959), Arrow (1962)).25
While this story certainly has a good deal of merit, it is becoming increasingly
di¢ cult to draw an unambiguous connection between the ￿basicness￿of a line of
research and the degree of appropriability of the resulting output. For example,
Howitt (2003) mentions an NSF survey which ￿nds that more than 22 percent
of all basic research in the US during the period 1993-1997 was￿ according to the
NSF￿ s de￿nition￿ performed by private enterprises. In our model, by contrast,
the relevant notion of basicness has nothing to do with appropriability, but
rather corresponds to the number of stages remaining until a commercial payo⁄
can be realized.
Going beyond the traditional appropriability arguments, Dasgupta and David
(1994) take a broader and more institutional view of the role of academia. They
emphasize that, as compared to the private sector, academia has a variety of
distinctive rules, norms and incentives that reward the production and rapid
di⁄usion of knowledge. These include peer review, priority rules, and rewards
based on the impact of publications (as measured, e.g., by citations).
Our work can be thought of as ￿tting in to the sort of institutional framework
advocated by Dasgupta and David (1994). However, we focus almost exclu-
sively on a single institutional attribute of academia, namely the commitment
that it embodies to allowing individual scientists to pursue their own preferred
research strategies. In so doing, we largely set aside many of the other features
highlighted by Dasgupta and David, including incentive schemes.26
By emphasizing the commitment role of academia, our model implicitly o⁄ers
a particular rationale for the tenure system, which has been prevalent for more
than half a century, especially in more research-oriented universities (McPher-
son and Schapiro (1999)). Our interpretation of tenure di⁄ers from that in
25Nelson (1959) also argues that the public sector has a longer time horizon, which makes
it more willing to undertake longer-term and more uncertain projects.
26In the spirit of Hart and Holmstrom (1987), one might ask the following: if all that
distinguishes academia from private ￿rms are their respective incentive systems, why do we
need two separate institutional entities to solve the underlying contracting problem, when a
more sophisticated incentive scheme would presumably also do the job?
32Carmichael￿ s (1988) well-known contribution: in Carmichael￿ s model, only in-
cumbent scientists are well-enough informed to evaluate potential new hires, and
tenure serves to reassure the incumbents that the new hires will not ultimately
displace them.27
The focus on academia as a commitment device can also be found in the
recent work of Lacetera (2005), developed contemporaneously with this paper.
Like we do, Lacetera adopts a control-rights perspective. However, unlike us,
Lacetera does not model research as a multi-stage process. For our purposes,
this multi-stage feature of the model is crucial, because it allows us to show
that academia is most useful in the early stages of a research program, while
the private sector tends to do better in the later stages. It also allows us to
compare the socially optimal transition policy to early privatization, and to
draw out the associated welfare implications.
Another recent paper which does model research as a multi-stage process is
Hellmann and Perotti (2004). They contrast the free ￿ ow of ideas in academia
with the more controlled informational exchange that occurs in private ￿rms.
In particular, they model a commercially attractive new research program as
consisting of two stages. The open exchange of ideas in academia maximizes the
probability of completing the second stage, and therefore of innovating once the
￿rst stage has been successful. But this open structure also raises the risk of the
￿rst-stage idea being stolen. Hellmann and Perotti view the private ￿rm as an
institution that guards against such stealing, by carefully recording the property
rights attached to ￿rst-stage ideas. Their paper shares with ours the goal of
endogenizing the choice of academic versus private-sector research. However,
instead of focusing as we do on control allocation, it emphasizes incentives to
share information. And, in contrast to our analysis, it stresses the commitment
powers of the private sector (in terms of its ability to restrict information ￿ ows)
rather than those of academia (in terms of academic freedom).
Finally, seeing organizations as di⁄ering in terms of the allocation of author-
ity is of course not new when talking about private ￿rms. A key element here is
that individuals value creative control and are therefore ready to work at lower
wages in return for more authority. This latter element is not entirely new ei-
ther: Hart and Holmstrom (2002) stress it when comparing focused ￿rms with
conglomerates, arguing that the former are able to pay lower wages because of
their greater commitment to pursuing the goals of their employees.
8 Concluding Remarks
This paper has provided a framework for evaluating the pros and cons of acad-
emic as opposed to private-sector research. We have argued that even in a world
with full IPR protection at all stages of the research process, academia￿ by virtue
of its commitment to leaving creative control in the hands of scientists￿ can play
27Of course, the goals of the two papers are very di⁄erent. Unlike us, Carmichael does not
seek to understand the role of academia, but rather takes its existence as given and tries to
rationalize one of its distinctive features.
33a valuable role in fostering multi-stage research lines that would not be viable
entirely in the private sector. Moreover, we have shown that it is possible for
ideas to be privatized sooner than is socially optimal, with negative consequences
for the overall rate of innovation. This latter point echoes some of the concerns
raised in the policy literature about the potential for an ￿anti-commons￿e⁄ect
due to excessive early-stage IPR protection.
In terms of directions for further research, it might be interesting to study
incentives more carefully in our framework. To take just one example, what are
the pros and cons of citation-based rewards and promotions in a world where
citations are only a noisy indicator of the value of a research contribution?
Do such citation-based incentives help to focus scientists on the right kinds of
projects, or do they simply tend to induce ine¢ cient fads or bandwagons into
the research process?
Finally, one might try to enrich our framework by giving a more important
role to academic openness than we have in this paper. As stressed above, the
de￿ning characteristic of academia in our model is the delegation of authority
to scientists, much more than the free ￿ ow of ideas across academic institutions.
In reality, it seems that openness is also a central attribute of academia, and
it would be nice to better understand the complementarity between academic
freedom and openness.
One possible extension of our model that might be helpful in this regard
would be to introduce a matching problem, so that the right scientists must be
found to work on each stage of a research program. If such matching of scientists
to problems is particularly critical in the early stages, a closed private-sector
￿rm will tend to be at a disadvantage, since it will be di¢ cult for the ￿rm to
know ex ante just which scientists are the best ones to hire. In contrast, in
academia, where ideas can circulate, a large group of scientists can scrutinize a
￿nished stage-i idea ex post, and each can try to ￿gure out if he has the right
set of skills to try to take it to the next stage. We hope to explore these themes
in future work.
349 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2: Let
f(x) = x ￿ (wp=￿)(1 + log(￿x=wp)) (43)
and
g(x) = ￿x ￿ (wa=￿)(1 + log(￿￿x=wa)): (44)
Then for any i 2 f1;:::;kg; we know from (23) and (24) above that
E(￿
p￿
i ) = f(￿i+1) (45)
and
E(￿a￿
i ) = g(￿i+1): (46)
Now, ignoring integer problems, if (i￿1) is the last transition stage between
academia and the private sector (in fact we will show that there is only one
transition stage), we must have:





i )g = E(￿
p￿
i ); (48)
where the last equality follows from the fact that private sector management is
optimal from stage i onwards.
We want to compare f(x) and g(x) over the range of x = E(￿
p￿
i )￿ s which
takes into account the fact that the optimal numbers of researchers in academia
or in the private sector at all stages, and in particular at stage i; are non-











so that we must have
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in order for both, n
p
i and na
i to be positive.
Next, consider the ￿rst derivatives of f(x) and g(x): We have:











which, together with (51), implies that the two derivatives f0(x) and g0(x) are
strictly positive over the relevant range of x = E(￿
p￿
i ):
35Moreover, both curves f(x) and g(x) are convex, and one can easily show
that
f(x) > g(x) (53)
for x su¢ ciently large. As we shall prove next, these properties of f and g;
together with the fact that x ￿ maxf
wp
￿ ; wa
￿￿g; will imply the uniqueness of the
cut-o⁄ point x such that f(x) > g(x) if and only if x > x:
Suppose ￿rst that wa ￿ ￿wp: If we then compare between f and g at the



































where the latter inequality follows immediately from the fact that
￿wp
wa




which in turn is always true because we know that for any real number y ￿ 1,
we have:
y ￿ 1 > lny: (57)
Now suppose instead that wa > ￿wp; then we have






since we already know that x ￿ maxf
wp
￿ ; wa
￿￿g. But this in turn implies that the
function
 (x) = f(x) ￿ g(x) (60)
is strictly increasing over the relevant range, and therefore has at most one zero.
The uniqueness of the intersection between the two curves f and g, together
with the fact that E(￿
p￿
i ) = ￿i is strictly increasing in i; establishes the lemma.
More speci￿cally, if x denotes the intersection between the two curves on their
upward-sloping parts, we already know that
x < V; (61)
otherwise research would always be performed in academia at all stages, contrary





36in which case it is socially optimal that research be performed at all stages in
the private sector, or
x 2 (E(￿
p￿
0 );V ); (63)
in which case it is socially optimal that research be run by academia for i ￿ i￿





Proof of Proposition 5: From the perspective of a social planner, there
is a unique transition point i￿
p, such that it is optimal for stage i￿
p to be the ￿rst
stage of the parent line conducted in the private sector. This transition point
i￿
p is the smallest value of i that satis￿es:
b x = E(￿
p￿
i ); (65)
where b x is the unique intersection between the curves
f(x) = x ￿ (wp=￿)(1 + log(￿x=wp)) (66)
and
h(x) = ￿x + (1 ￿ ￿)pr￿￿￿
o ￿ (wa=￿)(1 + log(￿￿x=wa)); (67)
that lies on the upward sloping part of f(x). (Note that h(x) is equal to g(x)
plus the expected value (1 ￿ ￿)pr￿￿￿
o from creating new lines in academia).
Consider the three curves f(x);g(x) and h(x) and the intersections x between
f(x) and g(x) and b x between f(x) and h(x); which correspond respectively to the
basic model without o⁄spring lines and to the extended model with o⁄springs.
One can immediately see that
b x > x; (68)
which in turn immediately implies that the optimal transition from academia to
private sector research occurs later than in the basic model without o⁄springs.
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40Table 1:  Details for Example 3 
 
  The parameter values for this example are as follows: academic wage w
a = 0; 
disutility of being forced to work on less-favored project z = 1; alignment probability α = 
0.5 (implying that private-sector wage w
p = 0.5); terminal payoff V = 100; individual-
scientist success probability p = 0.10; and number of stages k = 8. 
 
 
Panel A: Optimal Policy: first 3 periods in academia, last 5 in private sector  
 
Stage    # of Scientists   Stage Success Prob    Value Entering Stage 
8: private  n
p  =  28.9    0.95     π
p = 80.79 
7:  private  n
p  =  26.9    0.94     π
p = 62.59 
6:  private  n
p  =  24.5    0.92     π
p = 45.60 
5:  private  n
p  =  21.5    0.90     π
p = 30.12 
4:  private  n
p  =  17.5    0.84     π
p = 16.60 
3:  academia  n
a = ∞     0.50     π
a = 8.30 
2:  academia  n
a = ∞     0.50     π
a = 4.15 
1:  academia  n
a = ∞     0.50     π
a = 2.08 
  




Panel B: Early Privatization:  first period in academia, last 7 in private sector  
 
Stage    # of Scientists   Stage Success Prob    Value Entering Stage 
8: private  n
p  =  28.9    0.95     π
p = 80.79 
7:  private  n
p  =  26.9    0.94     π
p = 62.59 
6:  private  n
p  =  24.5    0.92     π
p = 45.60 
5:  private  n
p  =  21.5    0.90     π
p = 30.12 
4:  private  n
p  =  17.5    0.84     π
p = 16.60 
3:  private  n
p  =  11.9    0.71     π
p = 5.91 
2:  private  n
p  =  2.1   0.20     π
p = 0.12 
1:  academia  n
a = ∞     0.50     π
a = 0.06 
  
Ex-ante success probability = 0.044; ex ante value = 0.06. 
 
 Table 2:  Details for Example 5 
 
  The parameter values for this example are as follows: academic wage w
a = 0; 
disutility of being forced to work on less-favored project z = 1; alignment probability α = 
0.5 (implying that private-sector wage w
p = 0.5); terminal payoff V = 100; individual-
scientist success probability p = 0.10; and number of stages k = 8.  Each success on the 
alternative strategy yields γ = 10 stage-0 offspring. 
 
 
Panel A: Optimal Policy: first 5 periods in academia, last 3 in private sector  
 
Stage    # of Scientists   Stage Success Prob    Value Entering Stage 
8: private  n
p  =  28.9    0.95     π
p = 80.79 
7:  private  n
p  =  26.9    0.94     π
p = 62.59 
6:  private  n
p  =  24.5    0.92     π
p = 45.60 
5:  academia  n
a = ∞        0.50
*     π
p = 33.20 
4:  academia  n
a = ∞        0.50
*     π
p = 27.00 
3:  academia  n
a = ∞     0.50
*     π
a = 23.90 
2:  academia  n
a = ∞     0.50
*     π
a = 22.35 
1:  academia  n
a = ∞     0.50
*     π
a = 21.58 
  
Ex-ante expected number of successful innovations = 2.02; ex ante value = 21.58. 
 
*Note:  at each academic stage, there is now a 0.50 probability of moving forward to the 
next stage, and a 0.50 probability of having 10 stage-0 offspring.  From Example 3, each 
offspring is worth 2.08 if managed optimally from that point on. 
 
  
Panel B: Early Privatization:  first period in academia, last 7 in private sector  
 
Stage    # of Scientists   Stage Success Prob    Value Entering Stage 
8: private  n
p  =  28.9    0.95     π
p = 80.79 
7:  private  n
p  =  26.9    0.94     π
p = 62.59 
6:  private  n
p  =  24.5    0.92     π
p = 45.60 
5:  private  n
p  =  21.5    0.90     π
p = 30.12 
4:  private  n
p  =  17.5    0.84     π
p = 16.60 
3:  private  n
p  =  11.9    0.71     π
p = 5.91 
2:  private  n
p  =  2.1   0.20     π
p = 0.12 
1:  academia  n
a = ∞     0.50
**     π
a = 0.36 
  
Ex-ante expected number of successful innovations = 0.26; ex ante value = 0.36. 
 
**Note: at the first academic stage, there is now a 0.50 probability of moving forward to 
the next stage, and a 0.50 probability of having 10 stage-0 offspring.  From Example 3, 
each offspring is worth 0.06 if moved to the private sector as soon as possible. 